The requirement to redeploy in redundancies
The question of whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances for a person to be redeployed within an employer’s enterprise has been dealt with by the Full Bench in the matter of Ulan Coal Mines Ltd v Howarth  FWAFB 3488, with it being held that a decision under s.389(2) about whether “it would have been reasonable in all circumstances” for an employee to have been redeployed will involve various findings of fact regarding the evidence. The later Full Bench matter of Ulan Coal Mines Ltd v Honeysett  FWAFB 7578, (Honeysett) also considered the operation of the provision, which in turn was elaborated upon by the Full Bench in the matter of Technical and Further Education Commission v Pykett,  FWCFB 714. in which the following was decided about the operation of s.389(2);
“The Full Bench [in Honeysett] went on to make some obiter remarks about the operation of s.389(2):
“It may be appropriate to make some concluding remarks about the operation of s 389(2). It is an essential part of the concept of redeployment under s 389(2)(a) that a redundant employee be placed in another job in the employer’s enterprise as an alternative to termination of employment. Of course the job must be suitable, in the sense that the employee should have the skills and competence required to perform it to the required standard either immediately or with a reasonable period of retraining. Other considerations may be relevant such as the location of the job and the remuneration attaching to it. Where an employer decides that, rather than fill a vacancy by redeploying an employee into a suitable job in its own enterprise, it will advertise the vacancy and require the employee to compete with other applicants, it might subsequently be found that the resulting dismissal is not a case of genuine redundancy. This is because it would have been reasonable to redeploy the employee into the vacancy. In such a case the exception in s 385(d) would not apply and the dismissed employee would have the opportunity to have their application for a remedy heard. The outcome of that application would depend upon a number of other considerations.
Where an employer is part of a group of associated entities which are all subject to overall managerial control by one member of the group, similar considerations are relevant. This seems to us to be a necessary implication arising from the terms of s 389(2)(b). While each case will depend on what would have been reasonable in the circumstances, subjecting a redundant employee to a competitive process for an advertised vacancy in an associated entity may lead to the conclusion that the employee was not genuinely redundant.”
Honeysett is authority for the proposition that for the purpose of s.389(2)(b) it is sufficient if the Commission identifies a suitable job or position to which the dismissed employee could be redeployed. The Commission must then determine whether such a redeployment was reasonable in all the circumstances. We note that given the factual context the Full Bench in Honeysett did not need to consider whether s.389(2) may be satisfied if the dismissed employee could be redeployed to perform other work within the employer’s enterprise (or that of an associated entity.) Given its particular factual circumstancesHoneysett is not authority for the proposition that it is always necessary to identify a particular job or position to which the dismissed employee could have been redeployed.
As we have mentioned, the use of the past tense in the expression ‘would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to be redeployed …’ in section 389 (2)(a) directs attention to the circumstances which pertained when the person was dismissed. As noted in Honeysett, [T]’he exclusion poses a hypothetical question which must be answered by reference to all of the relevant circumstances’. The question is whether redeployment within the employer’s enterprise or an associated entity would have been reasonable at the time of dismissal. In answering that question the Full Bench in Honeysettobserved that a number of matters are capable of being relevant:
“They include the nature of any available position, the qualifications required to perform the job, the employee’s skills, qualifications and experience, the location of the job in relation to the employee’s residence and the remuneration which is offered”.
We have earlier set out the submissions of the appellant and the respondent as to the proper construction of s.389(2) (see paragraphs  to  above). We accept the respondent’s submissions. For the purposes of s.389(2) the Commission must find, on the balance of probabilities, that there was a job or a position or other work within the employer’s enterprise (or that of an associated entity) to which it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances to redeploy the dismissed employee. There must also be an appropriate evidentiary basis for such a finding. Such an interpretation is consistent with the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in the subsection; the Explanatory Memorandum and Full Bench authority. We acknowledge that the facts relevant to such a finding will usually be peculiarly within the knowledge of the employer respondent, not the dismissed employee. If an employer wishes to rely on the ‘genuine redundancy’ exclusion then it would ordinarily be expected to adduce evidence as to the following matters:
(i) that the employer no longer required the dismissed employee’s job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise;
(ii) whether there was any obligation in an applicable modern award or enterprise agreement to consult about the redundancy and whether the employer complied with that obligation; and
(iii) whether there was a job or a position or other work within the employer’s enterprise (or that of an associated entity) to which it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances to redeploy the dismissed employer.
The evidence in relation to (iii) would usually include canvassing the steps taken by the employer to identify other work which could be performed by the dismissed employee.”
See Smith v Don Watson Pty Ltd (2016) FWC 6740 delivered 23 September 2016 per Wilson C