Recovering expenses from employees

The practice of employers seeking to recover expenses incurred in sponsoring employees is perilous.

Here is an extract from a recent Federal Court decision about the risks.

“COERCION, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND MISREPRESENTATIONS

Introduction

  1. The applicants contend that Mr Usha made various threats to them to take adverse action against them to coerce them not to insist that they be entitled to retain the wages paid to them, contrary to s 343 of the FW Act, and exerted undue influence or undue pressure to secure their agreement to pay amounts to Mr Usha, contrary to s 344 of the FW Act.
  2. The alleged threats were made to Mr Basi in connection with the cashback payments and payments to cover Namitha Nakul’s PAYG tax obligations and to Mr Haider in connection with a payment to cover Namitha Nakul’s costs of its sponsorship of his subclass 457 visa.
  3. The applicants also contend that some of the threats made by Mr Usha also constituted misrepresentations for the purposes of s 345 of the FW Act.

Relevant statutory provisions and principles

  1. Section 343 of the FW Act provides:

343 Coercion

(1)          A person must not organise or take, or threaten to organise or take,  any action against another person with intent to coerce the other person, or a third person, to:

(a)          exercise or not exercise, or propose to exercise or not exercise, a workplace right; or

(b)          exercise, or propose to exercise, a workplace right in a particular way.

Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).

(2)       Subsection (1) does not apply to protected industrial action.

  1. Coercion requires the satisfaction of two elements, first, an intent to negate the exercise of choice, and second, the use of unlawful, or illegitimate or unconscionable means, determined objectively: Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2016) 245 FCR 39; [2016] FCAFC 72 (Buchanan J at [174]-[176] and [194], Siopis J agreeing at [1]). Although the matter went on to the High Court and the appeal was successful in part, these parts of the Full Court’s decision were not disturbed.
  2. So far as s 343 is directed towards conduct taken for a particular reason, ss 360 and 361 are relevant.
  3. First, the prohibited intent need form only a part of the reasons for the conduct. Section 360 of the FW Act provides:

For the purposes of this Part, a person takes action for a particular reason if the reasons for the action include that reason.

  1. Second, the alleged contravenor bears the burden on the question of the prohibited intent. Section 361 of the FW Act provides:

(1)      If:

(a)           in an application in relation to a contravention of this Part, it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a particular intent; and

(b)          taking that action for that reason or with that intent would constitute a contravention of this Part;

it is presumed that the action was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise.

(2)          Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to orders for an interim injunction.

  1. Taken together, those two sections operate to mean that a person who is alleged to have contravened s 343 must persuade the Court that an intent to coerce the other person as to their workplace rights was not amongst their reasons for the action.
  2. Section 344 provides:

344 Undue influence or pressure

An employer must not exert undue influence or undue pressure on an employee in relation to a decision by the employee to:

(a)          make, or not make, an agreement or arrangement under the National Employment Standards; or

(b)          make, or not make, an agreement or arrangement under a term of a modern award or enterprise agreement that is permitted to be included in the award or agreement under subsection 55(2); or

(c)          agree to, or terminate, an individual flexibility arrangement; or

(d)          accept a guarantee of annual earnings; or

(e)          agree, or not agree, to a deduction from amounts payable to the employee in relation to the performance of work.

Note 1:           This section is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).

Note 2:     This section can apply to decisions whether to consent to performing work on keeping in touch days (see subsection 79A(3)).

  1. “Adverse action” includes dismissal (s 342, Item 1(a)) or an alteration of the position of an employee to their prejudice (s 342, Item 1(c)). The term also comprehends threats to take adverse action.
  2. Coercion demands a high degree of compulsion negating choice. There is a significant difference in ordinary meaning between concepts such as influence, persuasion, inducement and the like, on the one hand, and coercion, on the other: National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia and Another (2002) 117 FCR 114; [2002] FCA 441 (National Tertiary Education) at [99] and [103] (Weinberg J). It is generally embodied by the threat to take away something possessed or an advantage that would otherwise be obtained: Ellis v Barker (1871) 40 LJ Ch 603 (Romilly MR); National Tertiary Education at [104].
  3. In Auimatagi and Another v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2018) 267 FCR 268; [2018] FCAFC 191, Allsop CJ, Collier and Rangiah JJ provided examples at [161] of conduct which has been found to be illegitimate, including making threats to put a company out of business.
  4. Section 345 provides:

345 Misrepresentations

(1)          A person must not knowingly or recklessly make a false or misleading representation about:

(a)          the workplace rights of another person; or

(b)          the exercise, or the effect of the exercise, of a workplace right by another person.

Note:       This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).

(2)          Subsection (1) does not apply if the person to whom the representation is made would not be expected to rely on it.

  1. Section 793 of the FW Act is directed at the liability of a body corporate for conduct of officers and employees. It relevantly provides that:

(1)       Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate:

(a)           by an officer, employee or agent (an official ) of the body within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority; or

(b)           by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether express or implied) of an official of the body, if the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the official;

is taken, for the purposes of this Act and the procedural rules, to have been engaged in also by the body.

Cashback arrangements

  1. Mr Basi gave evidence that Mr Usha said to him on many occasions words to the effect of:

(a)          “I can shut down the restaurant so that you can lose your job”;

(b)          “You could lose your job at any time if you don’t obey me”; and

(c)          “You would be the loser and I won’t lose anything. I already have Australian citizenship and business and I don’t need you to run the business. All of my family is in Australia.”

  1. Mr Usha denies making such threats, giving evidence that:

Sometimes, I said the – not the story like that. The story is business is not good. If it’s a lot of place, you know, the business is not good that times of day, I worried the workers. But in this case, you know, I can’t worry because the immigration – a lot of things there. So I can’t, you know, worried him. So ….. the stages for, you know, they close the restaurant and, you know, not doing the business sometimes the business is not good; that’s the reasons that I said.

  1. Mr Usha gave evidence of disciplinary conversations with Mr Basi. The respondents submit that such disciplinary action was well within Mr Usha’s rights as an employer.
  2. The respondents further submit that Mr Usha’s statements were not a threat to put Namitha Nakul out of business and influence a workplace right, but a statement of the reality of an underperforming business which was consistently trading at a loss.
  3. The respondents submit that Mr Basi is travelled, well-educated, holds a Master’s in business management, and admitted in cross-examination that not only had he completed a course in human resources management but was also aware of his entitlements including to leave breaks, breaks for meals and annual leave while working for Namitha Nakul.
  4. The respondents submit that it must follow that Mr Basi understood:

(a)          his visa was not conditioned upon employment with Namitha Nakul and he was able to transfer his visa, as he had previously done with Chellapas Pty Ltd, to a new sponsor;

(b)          his visa could not be cancelled by Namitha Nakul;

(c)          he should keep a diary of days and hours worked;

(d)          he had minimum workplace entitlements; and

(e)          he had protections at work and was entitled to ask the Fair Work Ombudsman about his pay and conditions.

  1. The respondents’ submissions fail to grapple with the vulnerable status of Mr Basi. He had lost his original sponsorship for his subclass 457 visa in Western Australia and was now dependent on Mr Usha, and given his current visa status he would not be able to obtain alternative employment unless an employer was prepared to sponsor his visa. Further, given the terms of the Basi Employment Offer and the prospect of an improvement in the financial position of Namitha Nakul by reason of the opening of the Nowra Restaurant, it is plausible that Mr Basi might not have sought to pursue his workplace rights for some time. Of course, this deferral was finite and Mr Basi subsequently did indeed seek to pursue his workplace rights, as demonstrated by the letters of demand written on his behalf by the South Coast Labour Council and the commencement of these proceedings. It is important not to allow hindsight bias to influence unduly an assessment of the plausibility of a particular state of affairs, in particular in the context of an alleged failure to pursue legal rights at an earlier time.
  2. Moreover the content of the alleged “disciplinary conversation” is telling. In the course of those conversations Mr Usha gives evidence that he stated to Mr Basi:

(a)          on at least two occasions in April 2017 that:

Midhun, I am going to close the Nowra shop because of your attitude. There is not much business. And too much food is being wasted.

(b)          in the course of a telephone call in July 2017 in which Mr Basi admitted that he had deliberately wasted food in the Nowra Restaurant because he was angry with Mr Usha:

Next time, if you do like that, I will give notice to the immigration agent to cancel the 457 sponsorship. You would need to find a new employer/sponsor.

  1. The attempt to explain away admissions that statements were made by Mr Usha to the effect that he would close the Nowra Restaurant and that he would give notice to an immigration agent to cancel Mr Basi’s “457 sponsorship” as “disciplinary conversations” is not persuasive in the absence of any independent corroboration of Mr Usha’s characterisation of the context in which they were made. Further, even if statements to this effect were made strictly in the course of “disciplinary conversations”, this does not preclude and rather supports Mr Basi’s evidence that they were made from time to time in the course of his employment and would have been very much at the forefront of Mr Basi’s mind when faced with the ongoing cashback requirements from Mr Usha. In any event, the issuing of “disciplinary warnings” in the nature of an “adverse performance assessment” may constitute adverse action for the purposes of s 340(1) of the FW Act, as it has the effect of altering the employee’s positon to his or her prejudice: see Sabapathy v Jetstar Airways and Others (2021) 283 FCR 348; [2021] FCAFC 25 at [54]-[63] (Logan and Katzmann JJ) citing, at [63], the following statement of principle in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1999) 140 IR 131; [1999] FCA 1531 at [95] (Branson J):

Conduct engaged in by an employee who has received such a warning could lead to the termination of his or her employment although the same conduct engaged in by an employee who had not received a warning would not lead to the termination of that employee’s employment. In a sense, written warnings under the respondent’s disciplinary procedures may be regarded as analogous to the receipt of driving demerit points. It seems to me that few holders of driving licences would doubt that the advantage enjoyed by them in holding driving licences is adversely affected by the accumulation of demerit points close to, but less than, the number required to trigger cancellation of their licences.

  1. I am satisfied that statements were made by Mr Usha to Mr Basi that he would “lose his job” or “lose everything”, and that they were threats of dismissal, or threats to alter his position to his prejudice and were designed to make Mr Basi compliant with the work arrangements Mr Usha had instituted, which involved him foregoing his “workplace rights”, namely his award entitlements, contrary to s 343 of the FW Act. I am not persuaded that the respondents have established that an intent to coerce Mr Basi not to exercise his workplace rights was not amongst the reasons for the threats made by Mr Usha to Mr Basi.
  2. I am also satisfied that the statements also involved the application of undue influence or undue pressure on Mr Basi for him to accept Mr Usha effectively deducting monies from his salary, contrary to s 344 of the FW Act. In context, the pressure that was applied by Mr Usha was excessive and disproportionate. The statements about Mr Basi losing his job are exacerbated by Mr Usha’s statements comparing his own migration status with Mr Basi’s. Mr Usha, having had a student visa and then a subclass 457 visa, would be acutely aware of the implications of loss of a sponsored position.
  3. For these reasons, I am satisfied that Namitha Nakul contravened ss 343 and 344 of the FW Act by requiring Mr Basi to make payments out of his wages to Namitha Nakul and that Mr Usha contravened ss 343 and 344 of the FW Act by being involved in the contraventions of ss 343 and 344 committed by Namitha Nakul.

August 2017 Basi Payment

  1. On or about 7 August 2017, Mr Basi made a cash payment of $4,200 to Mr Usha (August 2017 Basi Payment).
  2. The applicants submit the payment was made by Mr Basi in response to a demand from Mr Usha that Mr Basi cover the PAYG liability of Namitha Nakul for Mr Basi.
  3. The respondents deny ever requiring Mr Basi to Mr Usha to defray any PAYG tax payable on Mr Basi’s wages.
  4. Mr Usha gives evidence that the August 2017 Basi Payment was a partial repayment of the loan from Mr Usha’s brother, Harisankar, and subsequent instalment payments of $500 per fortnight made thereafter were in satisfaction of the balance.
  5. Mr Basi gave evidence that in or about May 2017, Mr Usha said to him:

You have to pay me [an amount which was about six thousand dollars] when you come back from your holidays to pay me back because I have to pay your tax.

  1. Mr Basi gave evidence that on or about 24 July 2017, after he had returned from holidays in India, that he asked Mr Usha to pay his wages of approximately $1,711 that had been due, but had not been paid, on 27 June 2017 but was told by him:

I paid it towards the tax bill. You still have to pay me the rest of that bill.

  1. Mr Basi also gave evidence that at the time he paid the amount of approximately $4,200 in cash to Mr Usha on or about 7 August 2017, Mr Usha said to him:

If you don’t pay, it could affect your permanent residency.

  1. I accept this evidence of Mr Basi concerning the circumstances in which he made the August 2017 Basi Payment to Mr Usha.
  2. As explained above, I do not accept that Harisankar advanced any money to Mr Basi and therefore the August 2017 Basi Payment could not have been a partial repayment of that loan. In the absence of any other explanation from Mr Usha and the poor financial position of Namitha Nakul, I accept Mr Basi’s evidence that Mr Usha demanded the payment from Mr Basi to pay for Namitha Nakul’s PAYG tax liabilities.
  3. It is improbable that Mr Basi would have willingly paid money back to his employer to meet his employer’s tax obligations in the absence of some form of threat of adverse action. The Basi payslips made plain that he was being paid fortnightly after tax wages referrable to the stipulated salary of $55,000 in the Basi Employment Offer. It is implausible, given Mr Basi’s proficiency in English and his tertiary education qualifications, that he did not understand that tax had already been deducted and retained by Namitha Nakul before he was paid his fortnightly wages during this period by bank transfer.
  4. The threat made by Mr Usha at the time of making the demand for the payment to meet Namitha Nakul’s tax obligations constituted a threat to take adverse action, namely action that could affect his permanent residency in this country and thus alter Mr Basi’s position to his prejudice.
  5. In context, I am satisfied that it was a threat that was made to ensure that Mr Basi complied with the demand for payment. The demand for payment was a demand that Mr Basi not exercise his workplace rights by retaining the wages paid to him, or insisting on his entitlement to those wages. The action was thus in contravention of s 343 of the FW Act. I am not persuaded that the respondents have established that an intent to coerce Mr Basi not to exercise his workplace rights was not amongst the reasons for the threats made by Mr Usha to Mr Basi.
  6. The representation that Mr Basi was required to pay the PAYG tax on his salary was a misrepresentation about his workplace rights. In effect, it was a misrepresentation that he was not entitled to retain all of the wages paid to him because he was under an obligation to return a proportion of them to his employer, when demanded, to meet the tax obligations of his employer. There is no such obligation. I am satisfied that it was a false and misleading representation with respect to Mr Basi’s workplace rights contrary to s 345 of the FW Act
  7. For these reasons, I am satisfied that Mr Usha contravened ss 343 and 345 of the FW Act by demanding between May and August 2017 that Mr Basi pay Namitha Nakul the sum of approximately $6,000 to defray its PAYG tax liability in respect of Mr Basi (First Usha PAYG Demand Contraventions).
  8. I am also satisfied that by reason of s 793(1) of the FW Act, Namitha Nakul also contravened ss 343 and 345 of the FW Act because of the First Usha PAYG Demand Contraventions.

January 2018 Basi Payment

  1. The applicants contend that Mr Basi made a payment of $1,710 in cash to Mr Usha in January 2018 (January 2018 Basi Payment). I note that in their submissions the parties referred to this alleged payment as the “December 2017 Basi Payment”.
  2. The applicants submit that the January 2018 Basi Payment was made in response to a demand from Mr Usha for a payment from Mr Basi to defray PAYG tax payable on his salary in contravention of ss 325, 343 and 345 of the FW Act.
  3. Mr Basi gave evidence that Mr Usha made a demand on Monday, 27 November 2017 for a contribution towards Mr Basi’s PAYG tax liability. He states that at the time the demand was made Mr Usha told him:

You better do something or else, it will be problem. You think about it.

  1. Mr Usha gave the following evidence when he was confronted with this this alleged demand in the course of his  cross-examination:

And at the end of November he made a call to you and you said you had received a letter about paying the tax, and he had to give you the tax money. That’s right, isn’t it?—No, no, that’s not right. That situation – the story is different. They changed the story. You know, one time, you know, I ask, you know, “Where is the repayment?”, and he said a lot of the excuse. I said, you know, “I take the money from the company. I have to put it back to the company. You know, the company have to – you know, the – a lot of things to do. Pay the bills and the tax and, you know, a lot of things to do. So, you know, give that money when you can give that money”. That’s the things I ask. The story totally different.

  1. Mr Basi states that he withdrew $1,710 from his bank account on 31 January 2018 and gave it to Mr Sulatha for him to pass on to Mr Usha to pay Namitha Nakul’s PAYG tax liability.
  2. Mr Usha denies receiving any money from Mr Basi as a payment towards Namitha Nakul’s PAYG liability. Mr Usha contends any money paid to him by Mr Basi was a repayment of the loans that he had made to Mr Basi.
  3. I am satisfied that Mr Usha made the demand that Mr Basi make a contribution towards his PAYG tax liability. As explained above, I do not accept that Mr Usha made any loans to Mr Basi and Mr Usha acknowledged in cross-examination that he had drawn a link in a conversation with Mr Basi between the payment requested and the tax obligations of Namitha Nakul.
  4. For the reasons set out above, the representation that Mr Basi was obligated to pay the respondent the PAYG tax on his salary was a misrepresentation about his workplace rights, contrary to s 345 of the FW Act.
  5. Given the “You’d better do something or else, it will be a problem” threat, in the context of the earlier threats made by Mr Usha, that demand amounted to a threat to Mr Basi’s employment. The threats made by Mr Usha constituted a threat to take adverse action. The threats by Mr Usha were either of dismissal, or that he would take action to alter Mr Basi’s position to his prejudice.
  6. I am satisfied that the threats were made to ensure that Mr Basi complied with the demand for payment. The demand for payment was a demand that Mr Basi not exercise his workplace rights by retaining the wages paid to him, or insisting on his entitlement to those wages. I am satisfied that the demand thereby was made in contravention s 343 of the FW Act. I am not persuaded that the respondents have established that an intent to coerce Mr Basi not to exercise his workplace rights was not amongst the reasons for the demand made by Mr Usha to Mr Basi.
  7. I am also satisfied that the demand was an unreasonable requirement by Namitha Nakul, as his employer, that Mr Basi spend money, contrary to s 325 of the FW Act.
  8. I note that the respondents accept that if the Court finds there was a payment made by Mr Basi to the respondents in January 2018, and that the payment was for the purposes of contributing to Mr Basi’s PAYG tax obligation, such a payment or requirement to spend money was contrary to s 325 of the FW Act.
  9. For these reasons, I am satisfied that Mr Usha contravened ss 325, 343 and 345 of the FW Act by demanding in December 2017 and January 2018 that Mr Basi pay Namitha Nakul the sum of $1,710 to defray its PAYG tax liability in respect of Mr Basi (Second Usha PAYG Demand Contraventions).
  10. I am also satisfied that by reason of s 793(1) of the FW Act, Namitha Nakul also contravened ss 325, 343 and 345 of the FW Act because of the Second Usha PAYG Demand Contraventions.

September 2017 Haider Payment

  1. The applicants contend that Mr Haider made a payment of $1,400 to Mr Usha in September 2017 in response to a demand by Mr Usha that Mr Haider make a payment towards the cost of Namitha Nakul’s sponsorship of his subclass 457 visa (September 2017 Haider Payment). They submit that sponsorship of a skilled employee provides a benefit to an employer and a demand that an employee defray the employer’s costs of the nomination is an unreasonable demand, contrary to s 325 of the FW Act.
  2. The respondents deny that Mr Haider made the September 2017 Haider Payment to Mr Usha. The respondents accept that if the Court finds there was a payment made by Mr Haider to the respondents in September 2017 and the payment was for the purpose of defraying Namitha Nakul’s sponsorship costs, such a payment or requirement to spend money would be contrary to s 325 of the FW Act.
  3. Mr Haider gave evidence that in September 2017, Mr Usha demanded that he pay $1,400 towards the cost of Namitha Nakul making an application for a subclass 457 visa that would be sponsored by Namitha Nakul, and at the time of making the demand Mr Usha told him that unless Mr Haider paid him that amount he would not submit the application. Mr Haider stated that in response to this demand from Mr Usha he gave Mr Usha $1,400 in cash at the Wollongong Restaurant.
  4. Mr Usha gave evidence that he did receive payments from Mr Haider in the form of repayments of loans that he had made to him but denied that he ever received any payments from Mr Haider in relation to Namitha Nakul’s “migration expenses”.
  5. I accept Mr Haider’s evidence concerning the September 2017 Haider Payment for the following reasons.
  6. First, Mr Haider was challenged on his evidence about the September 2017 Haider Payment. He did not resile from that evidence in the course of his cross-examination. His evidence in the following exchange was given forthrightly and without hesitation:

I put it to you that Mr Usha never demanded a sum of $1400 from you as payment towards his sponsorship costs?—No. That’s not true. He asked me.

He asked you and you say you paid it?—Yes. He asked me. I couldn’t have any other option.

Yes. Now, I say that’s not true. You didn’t pay it and he didn’t ask?—No. He asked and I paid.

And I say that Mr Usha never threatened to cancel your visa?—No. That’s not true.

  1. Second, Mr Usha was cross-examined regarding this issue and acknowledged that Namitha Nakul paid a sponsorship application fee of about $1,400 or $1,500 but maintained that he never required Mr Haider to reimburse him for that fee. The acknowledgment of the payment of an equivalent amount as a sponsorship fee to that claimed to have been paid to him by Mr Haider is significant.
  2. Third, I do not accept, as explained above, that Mr Usha made any loans to Mr Haider. Mr Usha advances no other explanation for any payments that he may have received from Mr Haider.
  3. Fourth, Mr Haider’s evidence about this matter is consistent with that of Mr Basi about the demands made of him for the cashback payments, and for money to meet Namitha Nakul’s PAYG tax obligations.
  4. For these reasons, I am satisfied that Namitha Nakul contravened s 325 of the FW Act by demanding that Mr Haider pay the amount of $1,400 in respect of its sponsorship of Mr Haider’s sub-class 457 visa (Namitha Nakul Sponsorship Contravention).
  5. I am also satisfied that Mr Usha was knowingly concerned in the Namitha Nakul Sponsorship Contravention and thereby contravened s 325 of the FW Act.

DISPOSITION

  1. There should be judgment for each of Mr Basi and Mr Haider against the respondents for the full amount of the underpayment under the Award of their wages plus tax.
  2. The amount of the judgment for Mr Basi is to be calculated as the difference between, on the one hand, the wages that would have been payable to him on the basis that he was employed full time by Namitha Nakul from Tuesday to Sunday, for 38 hours a week as a Cook Grade 4 at the Wollongong Restaurant from 19 July 2016 to 31 March 2017 and a Cook Grade 5 at the Nowra Restaurant from 1 April 2017 to 27 August 2018 with weekend penalty rates to be paid on the basis that he worked six hours on each of Saturday and Sunday, and on the other hand, the amount he received from Namitha Nakul of $76,417.78 less the cashback payments, the August 2017 Basi Payment and the January 2018 Basi Payment.
  3. The amount of the judgment for Mr Haider is to be calculated as the difference between, on the one hand, the wages that would have been payable to him on the basis that he was employed full time by Namitha Nakul from Tuesday to Sunday, for 38 hours a week as a Cook Grade 4 at the Restaurants from 31 October 2016 to 14 August 2018 with weekend penalty rates to be paid on the basis that he worked six hours on each of Saturday and Sunday, and on the other hand, the amount he received from Namitha Nakul of $29,980 less the September 2017 Haider Payment of $1,400.
  4. In addition, there should be judgment for Mr Haider on a quantum meruit basis for the wages that would have been payable to him on the basis that he was employed by Namitha Nakul for 30 hours per week at the National Minimum Wage in the period between 10 July 2016 and 30 October 2016.
  5. The parties will need to bring in calculations of the specific sums together with interest to enable me to make final orders to give effect to these reasons.
  6. I will give the parties an opportunity to lead any further evidence and make submissions on the applicants’ claims for the imposition of pecuniary penalties and on costs in the light of these reasons for judgment.”

 

Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 712 delivered 21 June 2022 per Halley J

The full decision can be found here Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 712 – BarNet Jade – BarNet Jade

Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 712 – BarNet Jade – BarNet Jade